Unifying Pedagogical Reasoning and Epistemic Trust

Unifying Pedagogical Reasoning and Epistemic Trust
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DOI:
10.1016/b978-0-12-397919-3.00011-3
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发表时间:
2012-01-01
期刊:
RATIONAL CONSTRUCTIVISM IN COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Shafto, Patrick
Shafto, Patrick
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Eaves, Baxter S., Jr.;Shafto, Patrick

文献摘要

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研究人员认为,其他人不仅为孩子的学习提供了巨大的机会,也带来了巨大的风险。关于教学推理的研究认为,孩子们会准备好识别并利用他人的帮助来教学,而这种教学推理使孩子们能够快速而有力地学习。相比之下,关于认知性信任的研究侧重于如何使他人的证词不被限制为真实的,因此,儿童必须准备好确定哪些告密者可以信任以获取信息。尽管这些问题显然是相关的,但到目前为止,这两个文献相对独立地存在。我们提出了一个从告密者那里学习的正式分析,统一并填补了每一篇文献中的空白。我们的分析解释了为什么从知识渊博和乐于助人的线人那里教会学习支持更可靠的推论。我们表明,我们的帐户比标准的从教学中学习的帐户更好地预测在教学情景中支持的特定推理。我们的分析还表明,认知性信任应该依赖于对他人知识和帮助的推论。我们发现,我们的知识和助益账户比标准的纯知识账户更好地解释了儿童在认知性信任任务中的行为。最后,我们讨论了对发展的影响,并概述了将从证词中学习视为对他人的知识和帮助的联合推论所提出的重要问题。
Researchers have argued that other people provide not only great opportunities for facilitating children's learning but also great risks. Research on pedagogical reasoning has argued children come prepared to identify and capitalize on others' helpfulness to teach, and this pedagogical reasoning allows children to learn rapidly and robustly. In contrast, research on epistemic trust has focused on how the testimony of others is not constrained to be veridical, and therefore, children must be prepared to identify which informants to trust for information. Although these problems are clearly related, these two literatures have, thus far, existed relatively independently of each other. We present a formal analysis of learning from informants that unifies and fills gaps in each of these literatures. Our analysis explains why teaching learning from a knowledgeable and helpful informant supports more robust inferences. We show that our account predicts specific inferences supported in pedagogical situations better than a standard account of learning from teaching. Our analysis also suggests that epistemic trust should depend on inferences about others' knowledge and helpfulness. We show that our knowledge and helpfulness account explains children's behavior in epistemic trust tasks better than the standard knowledge-only account. We conclude by discussing implications for development and outline important questions raised by viewing learning from testimony as joint inference over others' knowledge and helpfulness.