Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter?
Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter?
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.485403
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发表时间：
2004-10
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Farber
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文献类型：
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作者：
D. Farber
在这项研究中，我研究了财务报告体系的可信度与治理机制的质量之间的关联。我使用了 87 家被 SEC 认定为欺诈性操纵财务报表的公司作为样本。与之前的研究一致，结果表明，与欺诈检测前一年的对照样本相比，欺诈公司的治理较差。具体而言，欺诈事务所外部董事会成员的数量和比例较少，审计委员会会议较少，审计委员会中的财务专家较少，四大会计师事务所的比例较小，首席执行官兼任董事会主席的比例较高。然而，结果表明，欺诈公司采取行动改善其治理，并且在欺诈检测三年后，这些公司在董事会外部成员的数量和百分比方面具有与对照公司相似的治理特征，但在审计委员会会议的次数方面超过了对照公司。我还调查了治理的改善是否会影响知情的资本市场参与者。结果表明，欺诈公司的分析师关注度和机构持股量并未增加，这表明这些公司的可信度仍然是一个问题。然而，结果还表明，即使在控制了盈利表现之后，采取行动改善治理的公司也具有优异的股价表现。这表明投资者似乎重视治理改进。
In this study, I examine the association between the credibility of the financial reporting system and the quality of governance mechanisms. I use a sample of 87 firms identified by the SEC as fraudulently manipulating their financial statements. Consistent with prior research, results indicate that fraud firms have poor governance relative to a control sample in the year prior to fraud detection. Specifically, fraud firms have fewer numbers and percentages of outside board members, fewer audit committee meetings, fewer financial experts on the audit committee, a smaller percentage of Big 4 auditing firms, and a higher percentage of CEOs who are also chairmen of the board of directors. However, the results indicate that fraud firms take actions to improve their governance and that three years after fraud detection these firms have governance characteristics similar to the control firms in terms of the numbers and percentages of outside members on the board, but exceed the control firms in the number of audit committee meetings. I also investigate whether the improved governance influences informed capital market participants. The results indicate that analyst following and institutional holdings do not increase in fraud firms, suggesting that credibility was still a problem for these firms. However, the results also indicate that firms that take actions to improve governance have superior stock price performance, even after controlling for earnings performance. This suggests that governance improvements appear to be valued by investors.