Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information
Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information
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不完全信息下的技术采用
DOI：
10.2307/3003537
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发表时间：
1983
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jennifer F. Reinganum
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jennifer F. Reinganum
本文提出了一个静态博弈论模型，该模型描述了企业采用不确定盈利能力的技术创新的决策。给定采用成本、贴现率和对创新盈利能力的预期水平，我们确定每个公司倾向于采用创新的初始生产成本(纳什均衡)范围。我们发现，如果初始成本差异很大，那么采用新技术的是高成本企业，而低成本企业则避免采用新技术。公司采用成本的增加(或相当于公司贴现率的降低)使该公司不太可能采用新技术，而竞争对手公司可能或多或少地采用新技术，这取决于参数的初始值。
This article presents a static game theoretic model of a firm's decision to adopt a technological innovation of uncertain profitability. Given the levels of adoption costs, discount rates, and expectations regarding the profitability of the innovation, we determine the (Nash equilibrium) range of initial production costs for which each firm prefers to adopt the innovation. We show that if initial costs are sufficiently dissimilar, then it is the high-cost firm which adopts the new technology, while the low-cost firm eschews adoption. An increase in a firm's adoption cost (or equivalently, a decrease in the firm's discount rate) makes that firm no more likely to adopt the new technology, while the rival firm may be more or less likely to adopt, depending upon the initial values of the parameters.