Hardware Moving Target Defenses against Physical Attacks: Design Challenges and Opportunities
Hardware Moving Target Defenses against Physical Attacks: Design Challenges and Opportunities
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DOI：
10.1145/3560828.3564010
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发表时间：
2022-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Koblah;F. Ganji;Domenic Forte;Shahin Tajik
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文献类型：
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作者：
D. Koblah;F. Ganji;Domenic Forte;Shahin Tajik
移动目标防御(MTD)的概念已经根深蒂固，成为扭转网络战中典型不对称的一种可行战略。MTDS是一种技术，旨在使目标系统动态变化，以限制完成攻击所需的时间和信息，增加检测的可能性，和/或阻止攻击者继续攻击。MTD在网络级、操作系统级和应用程序级安全性方面的优势已得到证明。然而，硬件信任的根源是静态的“坐以待毙”，尤其是针对物理攻击，因此可以从MTDS带来的动态变化中受益。尽管许多MTD概念似乎可以转移到硬件应用程序中，但几乎没有任何工作来建立一个有效的研究渠道来对抗物理攻击。本文的目的是介绍可行的MTD概念，描述它们可以解决的问题，并为社区规划实现这些概念的途径。
The concept of moving target defense (MTD) has entrenched itself as a viable strategy to reverse the typical asymmetries in cyber warfare. MTDs are technologies that seek to make target systems dynamically change in order to limit the time and information available to complete an attack, increase the likelihood of detection, and/or deter attackers from proceeding. The benefits of MTD have been shown for network-, operating system-, and application-level security. Hardware roots-of-trust, however, are static "sitting ducks", especially against physical attacks, and can therefore benefit from the dynamics brought about by MTDs. Although many MTD concepts seem transferable to hardware applications, there has hardly been any work to establish a functioning research pipeline for countermeasures to physical attacks. The aim of this paper is to introduce viable MTD concepts, describe the issues that they can address, and chart a path towards their realization for the community.