From self to social cognition: Theory of Mind mechanisms and their relation to Executive Functioning
From self to social cognition: Theory of Mind mechanisms and their relation to Executive Functioning
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cognition.2015.02.001
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发表时间：
2015-05-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Gomez, Juan-Carlos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bradford, Elisabeth E. F.;Jentzsch, Ines;Gomez, Juan-Carlos
“心理理论”指的是将心理状态归因于自己和他人的能力（Premack 82 Woodruff, 1978）。本研究考察了心理理论（TOM）机制中的“自我”和“他者”信念归因过程在行为上的区分程度，以及这些可分离成分是否与执行功能（EF）能力有差异。一个计算机化的错误信念任务，利用匹配设计，允许直接比较自我导向和他人导向的信念归因，被用来评估ToM，一个人脸图像Stroop任务被用来评估EF，在典型发育的成年人群体中。结果显示，当将信念归因于他人时，反应时间明显长于识别和归因于自己的反应时间。有趣的是，结果显示，在错误信念试验中，“视角转换”要求（即从采用“自我”视角转变为“他人”视角，反之亦然）会影响反应时间。从自我到他人的视角转换比从他人到自我的视角转换反应时间明显更长。有人认为，“自我”构成了理解“他者”的基础，因此不管最终任务的要求如何，自我都会被加工；相反，“other”透视图仅在显式需要时处理。我们的结论是，接受另一个人的观点，即使他们的信念状态与自己的相匹配，比回忆和反思自我导向的信念状态需要更多的认知努力。(C) 2015年作者。Elsevier B.V.出版
'Theory of Mind' refers to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and other people (Premack 82 Woodruff, 1978). This study examined the extent to which 'Self' and 'Other' belief-attribution processes within the Theory of Mind (TOM) mechanism could be distinguished behaviourally, and whether these separable components differentially related to Executive Functioning (EF) abilities. A computerized false-belief task, utilizing a matched-design to allow direct comparison of self-oriented vs. other-oriented belief-attribution, was used to assess ToM, and a face-image Stroop task was employed to assess EF, within a population of typically-developed adults. Results revealed significantly longer reaction times when attributing beliefs to other people as opposed to recognizing and attributing beliefs to oneself. Intriguingly, results revealed that 'perspective-shift' requirements (i.e. changing from adoption of the 'self' perspective to the perspective of the 'other', or vice versa) across false-belief trials influenced reaction times. Reaction times were significantly longer when the perspective shift was from self-to-other than from other-to-self. It is suggested that the 'self' forms the stem of understanding the 'other', and is therefore processed regardless of ultimate task demands; in contrast, the 'other' perspective is only processed when explicitly required. We conclude that adopting another person's perspective, even when their belief state is matched to one's own, requires more cognitive effort than recalling and reflecting on self-oriented belief-states. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.