Campaign Management Under Approval-Driven Voting Rules
Campaign Management Under Approval-Driven Voting Rules
复制标题
批准驱动的投票规则下的竞选管理
DOI：
10.1007/s00453-015-0064-0
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Edith Elkind
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ildikó Schlotter;Piotr Faliszewski;Edith Elkind
类似批准的投票规则，例如基于真诚的胜利批准投票（SP-AV），Bucklin规则（K批准投票的适应性变体）和后备规则（Bucklin规则和SP-的混合体） AV）具有许多理想的特性：例如，它们易于理解，并鼓励候选人选择具有广泛吸引力的选举平台。在本文中，我们根据此类规则研究了选举活动管理的经典和参数化计算复杂性。我们专注于可以用来促进给定候选人的两种方法：要求选民以偏好顺序向上移动该候选人或要求他们更改他们批准的候选人的数量。我们表明，对于巴克林和后备而言，找到第一种类型的最佳广告系列管理策略都很容易。相反，即使我们需要影响投票的程度很小，第二种方法在计算上也很难。然而，我们确定了一大类的场景，这些方案接受了固定参数可拖动算法。
Approval-like voting rules, such as sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), the Bucklin rule (an adaptive variant of k-approval voting), and the Fallback rule (a hybrid of the Bucklin rule and SP-AV) have many desirable properties: for example, they are easy to understand and encourage the candidates to choose electoral platforms that have a broad appeal. In this paper, we investigate both classic and parameterized computational complexity of electoral campaign management under such rules. We focus on two methods that can be used to promote a given candidate: asking voters to move this candidate upwards in their preference order or asking them to change the number of candidates they approve of. We show that finding an optimal campaign management strategy of the first type is easy for both Bucklin and Fallback. In contrast, the second method is computationally hard even if the degree to which we need to affect the votes is small. Nevertheless, we identify a large class of scenarios that admit fixed-parameter tractable algorithms.
巴克林的操纵、贿赂和竞选管理的复杂性以及后备投票
影响因子：
1.9
作者：
P. Faliszewski;Y. Reisch;J. Rothe;L. Schend
通讯作者：
L. Schend
DOI：
10.1016/j.jcss.2014.11.002
发表时间：
2015-06
期刊：
J. Comput. Syst. Sci.
影响因子：
--
作者：
G. Erdélyi;M. Fellows;J. Rothe;Lena Schend
通讯作者：
G. Erdélyi;M. Fellows;J. Rothe;Lena Schend