Emergence of cooperation in public goods games
Emergence of cooperation in public goods games
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DOI：
10.1098/rspb.2008.1546
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发表时间：
2009-04-07
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Ihara, Yasuo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kurokawa, Shun;Ihara, Yasuo
合作的进化一直是进化生物学中的一个主要问题。合作不仅存在于二元互动中，也存在于两个以上个体的社会互动中。有人认为，直接互惠不能解释大群体中合作的出现，因为“合作”平衡状态的吸引力盆地随着群体规模的增加而迅速缩小。然而，这一论点是基于对考虑确定性过程的模型的分析。最近，二人博弈的随机模型得到了发展，并明确了在有限种群中有利于合作出现的自然选择条件。这些条件已经用数学上的简单表达式给出，称为三分之一定律。本文研究了n人博弈的随机模型，并证明了在n人重复囚徒困境博弈中，自然选择倾向于交换者取代叛逃者群体。我们还推导了三分之一定律的广义版本({2/[n（n+1)]}（1/(n-1)）定律）。此外，与以往的研究相反，该模型表明，在一定条件下，更大的群体规模可以促进公共物品博弈中合作的进化。
Evolution of cooperation has been a major issue in evolutionary biology. Cooperation is observed not only in dyadic interactions, but also in social interactions involving more than two individuals. It has been argued that direct reciprocity cannot explain the emergence of cooperation in large groups because the basin of attraction for the 'cooperative' equilibrium state shrinks rapidly as the group size increases. However, this argument is based on the analysis of models that consider the deterministic process. More recently, stochastic models of two-player games have been developed and the conditions for natural selection to favour the emergence of cooperation in finite populations have been specified. These conditions have been given as a mathematically simple expression, which is called the one-third law. In this paper, we investigate a stochastic model of n-player games and show that natural selection can favour a reciprocator replacing a population of defectors in the n-player repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We also derive a generalized version of the one-third law (the {2/[n(n+1)]}(1/(n-1)) law). Additionally, contrary to previous studies, the model suggests that the evolution of cooperation in public goods game can be facilitated by larger group size under certain conditions.