Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design
Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design
复制标题
凸势在机构设计中的应用
DOI：
10.1111/1468-0262.00233
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Eliot Maenner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Vijay B. Krishna;Eliot Maenner
本文建立了机制设计理论中“报酬等价性”结果的一般形式：在一定条件下，激励相容机制中任何类型的效用仅由分配规则决定到一个加性常数。当类型是一维的时，结果是众所周知的(例如，参见Myerson(1981))。当类型是多维的时，一旦假设足够的光滑性，结果就来自微积分基本定理。通过将基本定理推广到非光滑凸函数和更一般的正则Lipschitzian函数类，我们得到了一个更一般的结果。
THIS PAPER ESTABLISHES A GENERAL FORM of the" payoff equivalence" result in mecha-nism design theory: under certain conditions, the utility of any type in an incentive-compatible mechanism is determined up to an additive constant by the allocation rule alone. When types are single-dimensional the result is well known (see, for instance, Myerson (1981)). When types are multi-dimensional the result follows from the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus once sufficient smoothness is assumed. We obtain a more general result by using an extension of the Fundamental Theorem to nonsmooth convex functions and more generally, to the class of regular Lipschitzian functions.