Nonprofit and Proprietary Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials among Lawyers
Nonprofit and Proprietary Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials among Lawyers
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非营利和专有部门行为：律师之间的工资差异
DOI：
10.1086/298012
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发表时间：
1983
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
B. Weisbrod
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Weisbrod
本文侧重于营利性和非营利性私人部门的收入差异，并特别提到律师。对私人律师的收入公式进行了估计，并用来预测非营利性部门的“公共利益”律师在私营部门可以赚取多少收入。调查结果是，公益律师的报酬大大减少，他们知道这一点，而且经济牺牲是永久性的。接下来，我们估计了一个工作选择方程，它表明那些选择公益性工作的律师与那些选择私人法律实践的律师有不同的“偏好”。这种差异可能有助于解释公共利益律师愿意接受较低的金钱奖励的原因。还需要进一步研究，以确定在这两个行业中发现的律师差异是否也存在于其他行业，以及这种差异是仅在管理层一级还是在较低级别发现的。其目标是更好地理解营利性和非营利性公司之间的行为差异。
This paper focuses on earnings differentials in the for-profit and private nonprofit sectors, with specific reference to lawyers. An earnings equation for private lawyers is estimated and is used to predict what the nonprofit sector "public interest" lawyers could earn in the private sector. The finding is that the public interest lawyers are paid substantially less, that they know this, and that the financial sacrifice is permanent. Next, a job choice equation is estimated which suggests that those lawyers who choose public interest work have different "preferences" from those who choose private law practices. The difference may help to account for the willingness of the public interest lawyers to accept lower monetary rewards. Further research is needed to determine whether the differences found for lawyers in the two sectors are also found in other industries, and whether such differences are found only at the level of management or at lower levels. The goal is improved understanding of behavioral differences between for-profit and nonprofit firms.