Agency Costs in a Supply Chain with Demand Uncertainty and Price Competition
Agency Costs in a Supply Chain with Demand Uncertainty and Price Competition
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1040.0211
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
V. Narayanan;A. Raman;Jasjit Singh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
V. Narayanan;A. Raman;Jasjit Singh
在本文中，我们建立了一个制造商与两个零售商签订合同，然后在贝叶斯纳什均衡中内生地选择零售价格和库存量的模型。如果制造商设计了一个被双方零售商接受的合同，它将批发价格设定为两个相互冲突的角色之间的妥协：减少品牌内零售价格竞争，并诱导零售商将库存接近第一最佳水平（即对整个供应链最优）。在均衡中，填充率小于第一最佳。另一方面，如果制造商通过设计一个只有一个零售商接受的合同来消除零售竞争，那么将消费者分配给零售商是无效的。在这两种均衡中，供应链的绩效都严格小于第一最佳。然而，如果制造商能够补贴零售商的剩余库存，则制造商可以实现最佳的零售价格和填充率。在没有这种补贴的情况下，当两个零售商的竞争不那么激烈时，两个零售商的均衡就出现了。在此均衡中，数值结果表明，补贴未售出库存的价值是增加需求的不确定性，零售竞争的强度，和残值的库存，并减少制造成本和货架空间的机会成本。
In this paper, we model a manufacturer that contracts with two retailers, who then choose retail prices and stocking quantities endogenously in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. If the manufacturer designs a contract that is accepted by both retailers, it sets the wholesale price as a compromise between two conflicting roles: reducing intrabrand retail price competition and inducing retailers to stock closer to first-best levels (that is, optimum for the supply chain as a whole). In equilibrium, fill rates are less than first best. If, on the other hand, the manufacturer eliminates retail competition by designing a contract accepted by only one retailer, the assignment of consumers to retailers is inefficient. In either equilibrium, the performance of the supply chain is strictly less than first best. However, the manufacturer achieves first-best retail prices and fill rates if it can subsidize the retailers' leftover inventory. Absent such subsidies, the two-retailer equilibrium arises when the two retailers compete less intensively. In that equilibrium, numerical results indicate that the value of subsidizing unsold inventory is increasing in demand uncertainty, intensity of retail competition, and salvage value of inventory, and is decreasing in manufacturing cost and opportunity cost of shelf space.