Tunneling as an incentive for earnings management during the IPO process in China

Tunneling as an incentive for earnings management during the IPO process in China
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利益输送作为中国IPO过程中盈余管理的激励措施

DOI:
10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2009.10.003
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发表时间:
2010-01-01
影响因子:
3.6
通讯作者:
Yuan, Hongqi
Yuan, Hongqi
中科院分区:
管理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Aharony, Joseph;Wang, Jiwei;Yuan, Hongqi

文献摘要

被引文献

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我们以 1999 年至 2001 年期间在上海证券交易所上市的 185 家中国 IPO 公司为样本,结果表明,在 IPO 前期间,可以机会性地利用关联方 (RP) 销售商品和服务来管理盈利。我们还提供证据表明,此类行为可能是出于IPO后时期的利益输送机会的前景,即为了母公司的利益而利用少数股东的经济资源。我们提供了这样一种机会主义隧道工具的证据:中国母公司不偿还其新上市子公司向其提供的未偿还净公司贷款。此外,我们还提供了证据来支持我们的主张,即首次公开募股后的这种隧道行为与首次公开募股前通过异常RP销售进行的盈余管理之间存在关联。最后,我们证明中国首次公开募股的投资者显然未能认识到这两种现象之间的联系。研究结果加深了对IPO过程中盈利操纵的动机和后果的理解。它们强调了外国投资者在中国资本市场以及在非中国证券交易所交叉上市的中国企业面临的潜在额外投资风险,并对中国和其他需要加强对小股东权利保护的新兴市场产生政策影响。 (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. 保留所有权利。
Using a sample of 185 Chinese IPO firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 1999-2001, we show that related-party (RP) sales of goods and services could be used opportunistically to manage earnings upwards in the pre-IPO period. We also provide evidence that such behavior may be motivated by the prospect of tunneling opportunities in the post-IPO period, i.e., exploiting economic resources from minority shareholders for the benefit of the parent company. We provide evidence of one such opportunistic tunneling tool: non-repayment by Chinese parent companies of net outstanding corporate loans made to them by their newly listed subsidiaries. Furthermore, we provide evidence in support of our assertion of an association between such tunneling behavior in the post-IPO period and earnings management via abnormal RP sales in the pre-IPO period. Finally, we demonstrate the apparent failure of investors in Chinese IPOs to perceive the link between the two phenomena. The results enhance understanding of the motives for and consequences of earnings manipulation during the IPO process. They highlight a potential additional investment risk facing foreign investors in China's capital markets as well as in Chinese firms cross-listed in non-Chinese stock exchanges, and have policy implications for China and other emerging markets which need to improve the protection of minority shareholders' rights. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.