he Production Economics of a Vertically Separated Railway (2002) The Case of the British Train Operating Companies
he Production Economics of a Vertically Separated Railway (2002) The Case of the British Train Operating Companies
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垂直分离铁路的生产经济学 (2002) 英国火车运营公司的案例
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Cowie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Cowie
本文主要讨论生产经济学问题
围绕基础设施的垂直分离
从铁路服务到客运运营。一个
英国客运铁路私有化案例研究
被使用。英国的铁路改革方法在三个方面是独特的。首先，水平范围
原国有铁路分离，原庞大的国有企业被划分为 104 个独立的自治单位。其次，从政府白皮书发布到全面实施修订后的结构只有五年时间，实施这些结构性变革的时间非常短。第三，私营企业参与改革的程度，上述自治单位中有96家转入了改革试点。
私营部门。
最重要的发现是火车运营公司的规模很重要。因此，在铁路的任何垂直分离中，都需要考虑火车服务提供商的规模（以及数量）。此外，有人建议，所有英国 TOC 都在平均成本曲线的下行部分运营，即就火车而言，所有 TOC 都太小
公里产量。因此，重点领域之一
TOC 的生产力提升将体现在规模方面
经济体。最后，根据对基础设施价格弹性的估计，在英国的例子中，监管机构在控制垄断运营商铁路公司的市场力量方面似乎相当成功。
This paper focuses on the production economics issues
surrounding the vertical separation of infrastructure
from rail services with regard to passenger operations. A
case study of the British passenger railway privatisation
is used. The British approach to rail reform is unique in three aspects. Firstly, the extent of horizontal
separation of the former state owned railway, with the former monolithic state enterprise being divided into 104 individual autonomous units. Secondly, with only five years between the government white paper and full implementation of the revised structure, the time-frame over which these structural changes were implemented was very short. Thirdly, the extent of the involvement of the private enterprise in these reforms, with 96 of the autonomous units highlighted above transferred to the
private sector.
The most significant finding is that the size of train operating companies matter. In any vertical separation of the railway therefore, consideration needs to be given to the size (and hence number) of the train service provider(s). Furthermore, it was suggested that all British TOCs were operating on the downward part of the average cost curve i.e. all were too small in terms of train
kilometre production. Therefore, one of the key areas for
productivity gains for TOCs would be in the area of scale
economies. Finally, based upon estimates of the price elasticity of infrastructure, it would appear that in the British example the regulator has been reasonably successful in controlling the market power of the monopoly operator, Railtrack.