Nowhere to hide: informal disease surveillance networks tracing state behaviour
Nowhere to hide: informal disease surveillance networks tracing state behaviour
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DOI：
10.1080/14781158.2012.641272
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发表时间：
2012-01-01
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Davies, Sara E.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Davies, Sara E.
自2005年修订《国际卫生条例》以来，人们将更多的注意力转向各国，特别是发展中国家，将如何满足修订后的《国际卫生条例》所附的核心能力要求。首先，各国将如何加强其识别和核实国际关注的突发公共卫生事件（PHEIC）的能力？修订后的《国际卫生条例》的另一个重要但未得到充分审查的方面是，授权世界卫生组织（世卫组织）对非政府组织关于疾病爆发的报告采取行动。修订后的《国际卫生条例》可能标志着“疾病情报”的权力以及世卫组织如何敦促各国核实疫情事件的新篇章。本文旨在了解互联网监测响应计划（ISRP）是否有效地“命名和羞辱”国家报告疾病爆发。
Since the revisions to the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005, much attention has turned to how states, particularly developing states, will address core capacity requirements attached to the revised IHR. Primarily, how will states strengthen their capacity to identify and verify public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC)? Another important but under-examined aspect of the revised IHR is the empowerment of the World Health Organization (WHO) to act upon non-governmental reports of disease outbreaks. The revised IHR potentially marks a new chapter in the powers of 'disease intelligence' and how the WHO may press states to verify an outbreak event. This article seeks to understand whether internet surveillance response programs (ISRPs) are effective in 'naming and shaming' states into reporting disease outbreaks.