The Evaluation of Weighted Voting Schemes for the United Nations General Assembly
The Evaluation of Weighted Voting Schemes for the United Nations General Assembly
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DOI：
10.2307/2600685
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发表时间：
1983-09
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
W. J. Dixon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. J. Dixon
加权投票被认为是解决联合国大会代表权问题的一个可能的解决方案。以往对替代加权公式的研究没有认识到，在加权投票的条件下，实际投票权的分配和选票的分配很少成比例。本研究将投票权的概念付诸实践，并将其应用于偏离当前一国一票程序的14种投票公式下的联合国大会投票的集团分配。事实证明，在联合国大会等投票机构中，采用加权投票制调整代表性结构的方法存在很大问题。
Weighted voting has been suggested as one possible solution to the problem of representation in the UN General Assembly. Previous studies of alternative weighting formulas have failed to acknowledge that the distribution of actual voting power and the distribution of votes are seldom proportional under conditions of weighted voting. This research operationalizes the concept of voting power and applies it to the bloc distribution of General Assembly votes under 14 voting formulas which deviate from the current one state-one vote procedure. Weighted voting is shown to be a highly problematic method for adjusting the representational structure of a voting body such as the UN General Assembly.