Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation
Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation
复制标题
激发分配职位和薪酬的偏好
DOI：
10.1006/game.1999.0718
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Schummer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Schummer
摘要我们描述了经济的策略规则，其中代理人被分配了一个职位（例如，工作）以及一些可分配的好处 - 存在许多“任意”这样的规则，因此我们考虑了其他要求。比起Shapley-Scarf住房模型的复杂性（没有可分裂的好处）扩展到代理人共享位置的模型（无外部性）。
Abstract We describe strategy-proof rules for economies where an agent is assigned a position (e.g., a job) plus some of a divisible good. For the 2-agent–2-position case we derive a robust characterization. For the multi-agent–position case, many “arbitrary” such rules exist, so we consider additional requirements. By also requiring coalitional strategy-proofness or nonbossiness , the range of a solution is restricted to the point that such rules are not more complex than those for the Shapley–Scarf housing model (no divisible good). Third, we show that essentially only constant solutions are immune to manipulations involving “bribes.” Finally, we demonstrate a conflict between efficiency and strategy-proofness . The results extend to models (without externalities) in which agents share positions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D70.