Mandatory implicatures in Gricean pragmatics
Mandatory implicatures in Gricean pragmatics
复制标题
格莱斯语用学中的强制性含义
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Sven Lauer
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作者：
Sven Lauer
Gricean含义通常被视为一种非常弱的含义，即对话语字面意义的可选丰富。由于它们是可选的，它们不必出现在每次发言的场合，而且它们可以被明确地拒绝。此外，如果隐含被视为可选的丰富，错误的隐含不能成为话语不恰当的原因：如果知道隐含是错误的，它应该干脆不会出现。我认为这种观点是错误的。我们没有理由认为，格里斯式推理不能产生非常有力的推论，这些推论既不是可选的，也不是可以取消的，其虚假可能会使话语不恰当。此外，我指出，最近一些显性的理论并没有排除这种强健的隐含，没有额外的规定，并且在对一些明显的语义现象的调查中，非正式地呼吁使用Gricean推理来触发不恰当。我的结论是，只有当驱动隐含的语用压力以特定的方式依赖于语境时，隐含才是弱的、可选的和可取消的，而且没有理由认为所有的压力都是这种压力。
Gricean implicatures are often viewed as a very weak kind of implication, viz., as optional enrichments of the literal meaning of an utterance. In virtue of being optional, they need not be present on every occasion of utterance, and they can be explicitly denied. Further, if implicatures are viewed as optional enrichments, a false implicature cannot be the reason why an utterance is infelicitous: If an implicature is known to be false, it should simply fail to arise. I argue that this view is mistaken. There is no reason to think that Gricean reasoning cannot lead to very robust inferences, which are neither optional nor cancelable, and whose falsity can render an utterance infelicitous. Moreover, I point out that a number of explicit recent theories do not exclude such robust implicatures without additional stipulation, and that informal appeal to Gricean reasoning triggering infelicity has been made in the investigation of a number of apparently semantic phenomena. I conclude that implicatures are only weak, optional and cancelable if the pragmatic pressures driving them are context-dependent in a particular way, and further that there is no reason to think that all pressures are of this kind.