Multi-item auctions defying intuition?
Multi-item auctions defying intuition?
复制标题
多品拍卖违反直觉？
DOI：
10.1145/2845926.2845928
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Daskalakis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Daskalakis
如果买家在[c， c+1]中对每一件物品进行独立且均匀随机的估价，那么将n件物品卖给买家的最佳方法就是将它们捆绑在一起，只要c足够大。然而，对于任何c，大捆绑机制对于足够大的n都不是最优的，尽管随着n的增长，买家对这些商品的总价值会急剧集中。最优的多项目机制充斥着不直观的属性，使得Myerson著名机制的多项目概括成为一项艰巨的任务。我们调查了最近关于收入最优多项目机制的结构和计算复杂性的工作，提供了Myerson结果在多项目设置中的结构和算法推广。
The best way to sell n items to a buyer who values each of them independently and uniformly randomly in [c, c+1] is to bundle them together, as long as c is large enough. Still, for any c, the grand bundling mechanism is never optimal for large enough n, despite the sharp concentration of the buyer's total value for the items as n grows. Optimal multi-item mechanisms are rife with unintuitive properties, making multi-item generalizations of Myerson's celebrated mechanism a daunting task. We survey recent work on the structure and computational complexity of revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, providing structural as well as algorithmic generalizations of Myerson's result to multi-item settings.
DOI：
10.1145/2764468.2764539
发表时间：
2014-09
期刊：
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子：
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作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos
通讯作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos