Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
复制标题
大型私人价值拍卖的效率
DOI：
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jeroen M. Swinkels
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jeroen M. Swinkels
我们考虑一种商品的多个相同单位的歧视性和统一价格拍卖。玩家有自己的价值观，可能是不对称分布的，也可能是针对多个单位的。我们的设定考虑到了需求和供给的总体不确定性。在这种情况下，均衡通常是低效的。尽管如此，我们表明，如果拍卖“大”，这种拍卖会变得任意接近效率，并利用这一点推导出收入和竞标行为的渐近特征。
We consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units. Our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply. In this setting, equilibria generally will be inefficient. Despite this, we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are "large," and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior.