The kinematics of belief and desire
The kinematics of belief and desire
复制标题
信念和欲望的运动学
作者：
Richard Bradley
理查德杰弗里认为版本的贝叶斯决策理论，他浮动在'逻辑的决策'和一个概率动力学的想法-一个概括的贝叶斯条件的情况下，其中的证据是'不确定'-作为他的两个最重要的贡献哲学。本文旨在通过发展运动学模型来研究偏好变化和实际审议，从而将两者联系起来。偏好变化的处理方式类似于杰弗里对信念变化的处理：不是内在欲望加上信息组合的机械输出，而是判断和下定决心的问题。在第一节杰弗里的概率运动学的动机和扩展到治疗的变化条件的信念。在第二，类似的运动学模型开发的偏好变化，特别是信念引起的变化，取决于一个不变条件的条件偏好。在最后一节中，这两种观点被结合在一起，形成了一个实践性审议的尝试性模型。
Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs of combinations of intrinsic desires plus information, but as a matter of judgement and of making up one’s mind. In the first section Jeffrey’s probability kinematics is motivated and extended to the treatment of changes in conditional belief. In the second, analogous kinematical models are developed for preference change and in particular belief-induced change that depends on an invariance condition for conditional preference. The two are the brought together in the last section in a tentative model of pratical deliberation.