Cyber-physical security via geometric control: Distributed monitoring and malicious attacks
Cyber-physical security via geometric control: Distributed monitoring and malicious attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/cdc.2012.6426257
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发表时间：
2012-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
F. Pasqualetti;F. Dörfler;F. Bullo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
F. Pasqualetti;F. Dörfler;F. Bullo
信息物理系统在电力系统、交通网络、工业过程和关键基础设施中无处不在。这些系统需要在面对不可预见的故障和外部恶意攻击时可靠地运行。本文总结并扩展了我们在基于几何控制理论的网络物理系统安全性方面的研究成果：(i)我们提出了一个网络物理系统、攻击和监控的数学框架；（ii）我们从系统理论和图论的角度描述了基本的监测限制；（iii）设计了集中式和分布式攻击检测和识别监视器。最后，我们设计了一种针对一组发电机的攻击策略，以物理方式损害其他发电机的功能。新的贡献包括一个更通用的框架，新的集中式和分布式识别监视器的设计，以及攻击设计案例研究。
Cyber-physical systems are ubiquitous in power systems, transportation networks, industrial processes, and critical infrastructures. These systems need to operate reliably in the face of unforeseen failures and external malicious attacks. This paper summarizes and extends our results on the security of cyber-physical systems based on geometric control theory: (i) we propose a mathematical framework for cyber-physical systems, attacks, and monitors; (ii) we characterize fundamental monitoring limitations from system-theoretic and graph-theoretic perspectives; and (iii) we design centralized and distributed attack detection and identification monitors. Finally, we design an attack strategy for a group of power generators to physically compromise the functionality of other generators. Novel contributions include a more general framework, the design of novel centralized and distributed identification monitors, and the attack design case study.