Free Will - Philosophers and Neuroscientists in Conversation
Free Will - Philosophers and Neuroscientists in Conversation
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自由意志——哲学家和神经科学家的对话
DOI：
10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0011
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hall J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hall J
本章讨论的问题是，是否有可能存在具有自由意志的人工智能。这个问题归结为人工智能是否能够对一般领域的理性形成的意图采取行动。然而，可能无法区分由这种意图产生的行为和仅仅是模拟的行为。这可能是因为，正如中国房间的思想实验似乎表明的那样，意识直觉上是意向性的必要条件。对这一挑战有三种可能的反应。人们可能会说，只有意识才有可能实现全域的一般理性行为，或者说，系统也可能需要在正确的基底中实现，或者说，正确的微观功能主义结构需要为真实的意向性而准备就绪。
This chapter discusses the question of whether there could ever be artificial intelligence with free will. This question reduces to whether or not artificial intelligence will ever be able to act on domain-general rationally formed intentions. However, it might not be possible to distinguish between behavior that is produced by such intentions and behavior that is merely a simulation. This could be because, as the Chinese Room thought experiment seems to show, consciousness intuitively is a necessary condition for intentionality. There are three potential responses to this challenge. One could argue that full domain-general rational behavior is possible only with consciousness, or that it might also be necessary for the system to be implemented in the right substrate, or that the right microfunctionalist structure needs to be in place for real intentionality.