WHY MORAL PHILOSOPHERS ARE NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE MORAL EXPERTS
WHY MORAL PHILOSOPHERS ARE NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE MORAL EXPERTS
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01748.x
复制
发表时间：
2011-03-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Archard, David
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Archard, David
专业哲学家是生物伦理学家感兴趣领域的生物伦理委员会和监管机构的成员。这表明他们拥有道德专业知识，即使他们不直接且不受约束地运用它。道德专业知识被定义，并且考虑并拒绝了支持怀疑他们是否拥有这种专业知识的四个论点：道德哲学家之间关于道德问题存在极端分歧；缺乏明确识别道德专家的方法；如果缺乏客观性，就不能声称拥有专业知识；我为怀疑论提供了一个更好的理由，其基础是道德哲学与常识道德之间的关系：即现代道德哲学认为，即使是一种发达的道德理论，最终也植根于常识道德，即普通人掌握并用来规范自己生活的一套基本道德戒律。即使道德哲学家的道德专业知识确实有限，因为他们独自一人就可以充分发展一套道德判断，我概述了理由——植根于自治和民主的价值观——为什么道德哲学家不应该希望非哲学家服从他们假定的专业知识。
Professional philosophers are members of bioethical committees and regulatory bodies in areas of interest to bioethicists. This suggests they possess moral expertise even if they do not exercise it directly and without constraint. Moral expertise is defined, and four arguments given in support of scepticism about their possession of such expertise are considered and rejected: the existence of extreme disagreement between moral philosophers about moral matters; the lack of a means clearly to identify moral experts; that expertise cannot be claimed in that which lacks objectivity; and that ordinary people do not follow the advice of moral experts.I offer a better reason for scepticism grounded in the relation between moral philosophy and common-sense morality: namely that modern moral philosophy views even a developed moral theory as ultimately anchored in common-sense morality, that set of basic moral precepts which ordinary individuals have command of and use to regulate their own lives.Even if moral philosophers do nevertheless have a limited moral expertise, in that they alone can fully develop a set of moral judgments, I sketch reasons - grounded in the values of autonomy and of democracy - why moral philosophers should not wish non-philosophers to defer to their putative expertise.