Only Two Types of Strategies Enforce Linear Payoff Relationships Under Observation Errors in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
Only Two Types of Strategies Enforce Linear Payoff Relationships Under Observation Errors in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
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DOI：
10.1162/isal_a_00156
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发表时间：
2019-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Azumi Mamiya;G. Ichinose
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Azumi Mamiya;G. Ichinose
重复囚徒困境（RPD）博弈揭示了长期关系中竞争参与者之间的合作与竞争。在没有错误的RPD博弈中，零决定（ZD）策略允许参与者单方面设定自己的收益和对手的收益之间的线性关系，而不管对手的策略如何。另一方面，ALLD和ALLC等无条件策略也单方面设定了线性关系。然而，很少有人知道存在这样的策略在RPD游戏的错误。在这里，我们分析搜索的策略，执行一个线性的回报关系下观察错误的RPD游戏。因此，我们发现，即使在观察错误的情况下，唯一的策略集，强制执行线性回报关系是ZD策略或无条件策略。
The repeated prisoner’s dilemma (RPD) game has revealed how cooperation and competition arise among competitive players in long-run relationships. In the RPD game with no errors, zero-determinant (ZD) strategies allow a player to unilaterally set a linear relationship between the player’s own payoff and the opponent’s payoff regardless of the strategy of the opponent. On the other hand, unconditional strategies such as ALLD and ALLC also unilaterally set a linear relationship. However, little is known about the existence of such strategies in the RPD game with errors. Here, we analytically search for the strategies that enforce a linear payoff relationship under observation error in the RPD game. As a result, we found that, even in the case with observation errors, the only strategy sets that enforce a linear payoff relationship are either ZD strategies or unconditional strategies.