Moral heuristics
Moral heuristics
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DOI：
10.1017/s0140525x05000099
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发表时间：
2005-08-01
影响因子：
29.3
通讯作者：
Sunstein, CR
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sunstein, CR
关于事实问题，人们使用思维捷径，或经验法则，通常效果很好，但也会导致系统性错误。人们也会使用道德推理--道德捷径或经验法则，这会导致错误甚至荒谬的道德判断。这些判断不仅与道德高度相关，而且与法律和政治高度相关。从若干领域提供了例子，包括风险管理、惩罚、生殖和性行为以及作为/不作为的区别。在所有这些背景下，快速、直观的判断都很有意义，但有时会产生道德错误，这些错误会在法律和政策中复制。一个含义是，道德评估不应该通过诉诸对奇异案例和问题的直觉来做出;这些直觉特别不可能可靠。另一个含义是，一些根深蒂固的道德判断是不健全的，如果它们是道德伦理学的产物。在道德领域，容易出错的推理尤其有争议，因为在道德领域，人们很难就正确答案达成一致;但在许多情况下，推理确实在起作用，而且会造成真实的损害。道德框架的影响，包括在对后代的义务的背景下，也进行了讨论。
With respect to questions of fact, people use heuristics - mental short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that generally work well, but that also lead to systematic errors. People use moral heuristics too - moral short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that lead to mistaken and even absurd moral judgments. These judgments are highly relevant not only to morality, but to law and politics as well. Examples are given from a number of domains, including risk regulation, punishment, reproduction and sexuality, and the act/omission distinction. In all of these contexts, rapid, intuitive judgments make a great deal of sense, but sometimes produce moral mistakes that are replicated in law and policy One implication is that moral assessments ought not to be made by appealing to intuitions about exotic cases and problems; those intuitions are particularly unlikely to be reliable. Another implication is that some deeply held moral judgments are unsound if they are products of moral heuristics. The idea of error-prone heuristics is especially controversial in the moral domain, where agreement on the correct answer may be hard to elicit; but in many contexts, heuristics are at work and they do real damage. Moral framing effects, including those in the context of obligations to future generations, are also discussed.