Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation
Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation
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合同复杂性、激励措施和授权的价值
DOI：
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Reichelstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nahum D. Melumad;Dilip Mookherjee;S. Reichelstein
在适用披露原则的环境中，授权安排往往不如集中决策，充其量只能达到同样的绩效水平。本文研究了当组织受到合同中意外事件数量的约束时，授权的价值。对于信息不对称的委托代理设置，我们比较集中的机制，其中的主要保留唯一的责任，承包和协调生产，与授权机制，其中一个代理（经理）被授予权力与其他代理人签订合同，协调生产。相对于集中化，授权会导致控制权的丧失，但允许决策对管理者的私人信息更加敏感。我们确定的情况下，灵活性增益超过控制损失，使代表团出现上级集中承包。版权所有（c）1997马萨诸塞州理工学院。
In settings where the revelation principle applies, delegation arrangements are frequently inferior to centralized decision making, and at best achieve the same level of performance. This paper studies the value of delegation when organizations are constrained by a bound on the number of contingencies in any contract. For a principal-agent setting with asymmetric information, we compare centralized mechanisms where the principal retains sole responsibility for contracting and coordinating production, with delegation mechanisms where one agent (a manager) is delegated authority to contract with other agents and coordinate production. Relative to centralization, delegation entails a control loss, but allows decisions to be more sensitive to the manager's private information. We identify circumstances under which the flexibility gain outweighs the control loss, so that delegation emerges superior to centralized contracting. Copyright (c) 1997 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.