Public capital and optimal taxes without commitment
Public capital and optimal taxes without commitment
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无需承诺的公共资本和最优税收
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Andrés Velasco
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Benhabib;A. Rustichini;Andrés Velasco
我们考虑一个代表性的代理人，无限地平线经济，其中生产需要私人和公共资本。公共资本的供给是通过扭曲性税收来融资的。仁慈政府的最优（次优）税收政策是时间不一致的。因此，我们明确地引入约束，即在任何时候都不需要修改原始税收计划。我们完全描述了满足这一约束的（第三最佳）税收计划，并估计了第二和第三最佳政策之间的税率差异。
We consider a representative agent, infinite-horizon economy where production requires private and public capital. The supply of public capital is financed through distortionary taxation. The optimal (second best) tax policy of a benevolent government is time inconsistent. We therefore introduce explicitely the constraint that at no point in time the revision of the original tax plan is desirable. We completely characterize the (third best) tax plan that satisfies this constraint, and estimate the difference in tax rate between the second and third best policy for a wide range of parameters.