Distributed Detection with Multiple Sensors in the Presence of Sybil Attacks
Distributed Detection with Multiple Sensors in the Presence of Sybil Attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001514
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发表时间：
2022-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
W. Hashlamoun;Swastik Brahma;P. Varshney
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Hashlamoun;Swastik Brahma;P. Varshney
针对Sybil攻击下传感器节点的分布式检测问题，提出了一种新的检测方法，即恶意传感器节点利用多个虚假身份向融合中心（FC）发送多个伪造的决策，从而降低其决策性能。我们在Neyman-Pearson（NP）模型下研究了这个问题。我们发现，由于西比尔攻击，在FC收到的决定变得相关，相关程度取决于使用的假身份的数量。本文描述了使FC失明的最优Sybil攻击，即，使财务委员会无法作出明智的决定。我们发现，如果传感器节点的本地检测概率和虚警概率之和为1，则当至少50%的决策是使用假身份发送时，FC可以被设为盲。然而，如果不满足此条件，则必须使用假身份发送所有决策以使FC失明。本文还研究了FC和Sybil攻击者之间的战略互动，利用博弈论，并证明了纳什均衡（NE）的存在性。数值结果获得重要的见解。
This paper considers the problem of distributed detection in the presence of a Sybil attack where a malicious sensor node can send multiple falsified decisions using multiple fake identities to a Fusion Center (FC) to degrade its decision-making performance. We study the problem under the Neyman-Pearson (NP) setup. We find that, due to the Sybil attack, the decisions received at the FC become correlated and that the degree of correlation is dependent on the number of fake identities used. The paper characterizes the optimal Sybil attack that blinds the FC, i.e., makes the FC incapable of making an informed decision. We find that if the sum of the local detection and false alarm probabilities of the sensor nodes is 1, the FC can be made blind when at least 50% of the decisions are sent using fake identities. However, if this condition is not met, then all decisions would have to be sent using fake identities in order to blind the FC. The paper also investigates strategic interactions between the FC and the Sybil attacker using Game Theory and proves the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE). Numerical results are presented to gain important insights.