A CREDIBLE FOUNDATION FOR LONG TERM INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
A CREDIBLE FOUNDATION FOR LONG TERM INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
复制标题
气候变化问题长期国际合作的可靠基础
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Wilcoxen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Warwick McKibbin;P. Wilcoxen
为了成功减少二氧化碳排放，气候政策必须建立可信的长期激励措施，鼓励对新能源部门资本和研发的投资。我们认为，可信度意味着国际协议应侧重于加强国家间的协调与合作，而不是胁迫。在国家一级，信誉需要政治和经济激励措施，可通过长期可交易排放许可证提供，但它需要比传统许可证制度更大的灵活性。我们认为，提供可靠的长期激励的最佳机制是长期和短期排放许可证的混合系统。该系统的关键方面将在各国之间进行协调，但许可证将仅在国家边界内发放和交易。
To succeed in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, a climate policy must establish credible long-term incentives for investments in new energy-sector capital and in research and development. We argue that credibility implies that international agreements should focus on enhancing coordination and collaboration between countries, rather than on coercion. At the national level, credibility requires political and economic incentives that can be provided by long-term tradable emissions permits, but it needs more flexibility than can be provided by a conventional permit system. We argue that the best mechanism for providing credible long-term incentives is a hybrid system of long and short term emissions permits. Key aspects of the system would be coordinated across countries but the permits would be issued and traded solely within national borders.