OPTIMAL TAX PROGRESSIVITY: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
OPTIMAL TAX PROGRESSIVITY: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
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DOI：
10.1093/qje/qjx018
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发表时间：
2017-11-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Violante, Giovanni L.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Heathcote, Jonathan;Storesletten, Kjetil;Violante, Giovanni L.
什么决定了税收和转移支付系统的最佳累进程度？一方面，累进税制可以抵消初始条件的不平等，并取代针对特殊收益风险的不完善的私人保险。另一方面，累进制降低了工作和投资于技能的激励，当政府必须为公共产品提供资金时，这种扭曲的代价尤其高昂。我们开发了一个易于处理的均衡模型，具有所有这些权衡。我们推导出的社会福利的分析表达式提供了一个透明的理解偏好，技术和市场结构参数如何影响最佳程度的累进性。对美国经济的校准表明，内生技能投资、灵活的劳动力供应和为政府采购提供资金的愿望在限制最优累进性方面发挥了类似的作用。在贫困限制技能投资的模型版本中，最优累进性接近美国价值。对跨国数据的实证分析为这一理论提供了支持。
What shapes the optimal degree of progressivity of the tax and transfer system? On the one hand, a progressive tax system can counteract inequality in initial conditions and substitute for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. On the other hand, progressivity reduces incentives to work and to invest in skills, distortions that are especially costly when the government must finance public goods. We develop a tractable equilibrium model that features all of these trade-offs. The analytical expressions we derive for social welfare deliver a transparent understanding of how preference, technology, and market structure parameters influence the optimal degree of progressivity. A calibration for the U.S. economy indicates that endogenous skill investment, flexible labor supply, and the desire to finance government purchases play quantitatively similar roles in limiting optimal progressivity. In a version of the model where poverty constrains skill investment, optimal progressivity is close to the U.S. value. An empirical analysis on cross-country data offers support to the theory.