Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Economy Perspective
Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Economy Perspective
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财政分权：政治经济学视角
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ben Lockwood
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ben Lockwood
本文综述了近年来从政治经济学角度对财政分权进行研究的成果。有人认为，这种方法可以捕捉，在各种正式的模型，似是而非的和有影响力的想法（越来越多的经验证据的支持），财政分权可以导致改善优惠匹配和问责制的政府。特别是，最近的工作集中提供公共产品提供通过在立法机关讨价还价显示如何集中减少偏好匹配，最近的工作使用“选举机构”模型正式的问责制的论点。这些模型还提供了关于权力下放何时可能无法带来这些好处的见解。
This paper surveys recent contributions to the study of fiscal decentralization which adopt a political economy approach. It is argued that this approach can capture, in a variety of formal models, the plausible and influential ideas (increasingly, supported by empirical evidence) that fiscal decentralization can lead to improved preference-matching and accountability of government. In particular, recent work on centralized provision of public good provision via bargaining in a legislature shows how centralization reduces preference-matching, and recent work using "electoral agency" models formalizes the accountability argument. These models also provide insights into when decentralization may fail to deliver these benefits.