FEAR OF FIRE SALES, ILLIQUIDITY SEEKING, AND CREDIT FREEZES
FEAR OF FIRE SALES, ILLIQUIDITY SEEKING, AND CREDIT FREEZES
复制标题
DOI：
10.1093/qje/qjr012
复制
发表时间：
2011-05-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Rajan, Raghuram G.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Diamond, Douglas W.;Rajan, Raghuram G.
如果危机风险变高，是否有必要通过关闭一些银行并迫使其他银行出售资产来清理银行体系？未来可能被迫出售非流动性资产的受损银行有私人动机持有，而不是出售这些资产。预计可能发生火灾销售，流动性买家期望获得高回报，从而降低了他们放贷的动机。因此，私下里的最优交易决策会导致更糟糕的甩卖销售和比必要的更大的贷款下降。我们讨论了清理系统的替代方法以及相关的成本和收益。
Is there any need to clean up a banking system by closing some banks and forcing others to sell assets if the risk of a crisis becomes high? Impaired banks that may be forced to sell illiquid assets in the future have private incentives to hold, rather than sell, those assets Anticipating a potential fire sale, liquid buyers expect high returns, reducing their incentive to lend. Privately optimal trading decisions therefore lead to a worse fire sale and a larger drop in lending than is necessary. We discuss alternative ways of cleaning up the system and the associated costs and benefits.