Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts
Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.965888
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发表时间：
2012-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
E. Goldman;Jongil So;Jörg Rocholl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Goldman;Jongil So;Jörg Rocholl
本文分析了美国上市公司董事会的政治关系是否会影响政府采购合同的分配。它侧重于1994年选举后众议院和参议院控制权的变化，并发现董事会与获胜（失败）方有关的公司在选举后采购合同大幅增加（减少）。在控制了行业分类以及其他几个公司特征之后，结果仍然很重要。调查结果突显了企业政治关系为美国企业增加价值的主要途径之一。版权所有2013，牛津大学出版社。
This article analyzes whether political connections of the board of directors of publicly traded companies in the USA affect the allocation of government procurement contracts. It focuses on the change in control of both House and Senate following the 1994 election and finds that companies with boards connected to the winning (losing) party experience a significant and large increase (decrease) in procurement contracts after the election. The results remain significant after controlling for industry classifications as well as for several other company characteristics. The findings highlight one of the main avenues through which corporate political connections add value to US companies. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.