Incorporating others: what an extended self tells us about intersubjectivity
Incorporating others: what an extended self tells us about intersubjectivity
复制标题
融入他人：扩展的自我告诉我们什么是主体间性
DOI：
10.1177/1059712318789921
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Maria Clara Garavito
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Maria Clara Garavito
合并是身体的能力，采取的东西，以改变或扩大自己。在关于这一主题的文献中，对什么是合并进行了激烈的辩论。根据扩展心智假说，任何扩展我们认知过程的东西都会被整合。与此同时，这个物体成为我们自我表现的一部分。然而，德·普莱斯特（De Preester）在我称之为狭义的结合（incorporation）中提出，只有当一个客体被包含在身体的所有权意义上时，它才被结合到自我中。在这里，我探讨了一个更广泛的版本的纳入，与梅洛庞蒂的习惯和纳入的想法。从这个角度来看，融入是自我在与世界打交道时扩展和改变自己的方式。自我作为一个活生生的身体，在自我对世界的构成性开放中出现;因此，对象（甚至其他对象）如果参与构成性经验，就会以一种时间和情境的方式被纳入。最后，这种观点探讨了灵活和透明的自我，而不是基于身体表征的固定自我的想法。
Incorporation is the body’s capacity to take something to alter or extend itself. In the literature on the subject, there is a lively debate on what constitutes incorporation. According to the Hypothesis of Extended Mind, whatever extends our cognitive processes is incorporated. At the same time, that object becomes a part of our self-manifestation. However, De Preester, in what I call a narrow version of incorporation, proposes that an object is incorporated to the self only if it is included in the sense of ownership of the body. Here, I explore a broader version of incorporation, related to Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of habit and incorporation. From this perspective, incorporation is the way a self expands and alters itself in its dealings with the world. A self, as a lived body, emerges in the self’s constitutive openness to worlds; therefore, objects (and even others) are incorporated in a temporal and situated way if they participate in constitutive experiences. Finally, this perspective explores the idea of a flexible and transparent self rather than a fixed self based on representations of the body.