A standard cell-based leakage power analysis attack countermeasure using symmetric dual-rail logic
A standard cell-based leakage power analysis attack countermeasure using symmetric dual-rail logic
复制标题
使用对称双轨逻辑的基于标准单元的泄漏功率分析攻击对策
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nian;Yu;Hong
泄漏功率分析 (LPA) 攻击旨在通过测量加密设备的静态（泄漏）功率来查找其密钥。这种新颖的功率分析攻击利用了互补金属氧化物半导体 (CMOS) 集成电路的泄漏功率对其处理的数据的依赖性。本文提出了对称双轨逻辑（SDRL），这是一种标准单元 LPA 攻击对策，理论上可以抵抗 LPA 攻击。该技术结合了标准构建块来制造新的复合标准单元，其接近恒定泄漏功耗。实验结果表明 SDRL 是实现抗 LPA 加密处理器的一种有前途的方法。
Leakage power analysis (LPA) attacks aim at finding the secret key of a cryptographic device from measurements of its static (leakage) power. This novel power analysis attacks take advantage of the dependence of the leakage power of complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) integrated circuits on the data they process. This paper proposes symmetric dual-rail logic (SDRL), a standard cell LPA attack countermeasure that theoretically resists the LPA attacks. The technique combines standard building blocks to make new compound standard cells, which are close to constant leakage power consumption. Experiment results show SDRL is a promising approach to implement an LPA-resistant crypto processor.