Upstream Competition and Downstream Buyer Power
Upstream Competition and Downstream Buyer Power
复制标题
上游竞争和下游买家力量
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
John Thanassoulis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Howard W. Smith;John Thanassoulis
本文考虑了在上游竞争的情况下供应同质产品的买方势力。上游竞争的一个可能后果是，每个供应商都不确定其最终产量，因为它不知道有多少下游买家会选择它作为卖方。我们提出了一个模型，由于这个原因，最终的数量是不确定的每个卖家。当剩余函数为非线性时，我们发现了买方力量的一个新来源：与大买方谈判的事件增加了卖方的预期产出，这改变了交易的预期平均净剩余;当卖方的剩余函数为凹函数时，这增加了买方力量（当为凸函数时，这减少了买方力量）。我们探讨福利，行业生产力和投资激励的后果。
This paper considers buyer power in the presence of upstream competition to supply a homogeneous product. A likely consequence of upstream competition is that each supplier is uncertain of its final output, because it does not know how many downstream buyers will select it as a seller. We present a model where, for this reason, final volumes are uncertain for each seller. We find a new source of buyer power when the surplus function is nonlinear: the event of negotiation with a large buyer increases the seller's expected output, which changes the expected average net surplus from the deal; this increases buyer power when the seller's surplus function is concave (and diminishes it when convex). We explore consequences for welfare, industry productivity, and investment incentives.