General attainability beliefs moderate the motivational effects of counterfactual thinking

General attainability beliefs moderate the motivational effects of counterfactual thinking
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一般可达到性信念调节反事实思维的动机效应

DOI:
10.1016/j.jesp.2012.04.016
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发表时间:
2012
影响因子:
3.5
通讯作者:
K. Markman
K. Markman
中科院分区:
心理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Elizabeth A. Dyczewski;K. Markman

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以前的研究已经证明,在可重复任务中,由于不太理想的结果而产生的向上反事实比向下反事实更具激励作用。然而,在目前的工作中,假设向上的反事实只应该在人们相信通常可以实现改进的程度上才是激励的。相比之下,假设向上的反事实实际上应该减少动力,而向下的反事实应该增强动力,以至于人们认为改善通常是不可能实现的。为了支持这些假设,两项研究的结果表明,增量理论家(他们认为智力相关能力是可塑性的)在向上反应时表现出比向下反事实更大的动机和更好的表现,而实体理论家(他们认为智力相关能力是固定的)比向上反事实表现出更大的动机和更好的表现。
Previous research has demonstrated that upward counterfactuals generated in response to less than optimal outcomes on repeatable tasks are more motivating than are downward counterfactuals. In the present work, however, it was hypothesized that upward counterfactuals should only be motivating to the extent that one believes that improvement is generally attainable. By contrast, it was hypothesized that upward counterfactuals should actually diminish motivation and downward counterfactuals should enhance motivation to the extent that one believes that improvement is generally unattainable. In support of these hypotheses, the results of two studies indicated that incremental theorists (who believe that intelligence-related abilities are malleable) displayed greater motivation and enhanced performance in response to upward as compared to downward counterfactuals, whereas entity theorists (who believe that intelligence-related abilities are fixed) displayed greater motivation and enhanced performance in response to downward as compared to upward counterfactuals.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2007.04.002
发表时间: 2008-05-01
影响因子: 3.5
作者:
Summerville, Amy;Roese, Neal J.
通讯作者: Roese, Neal J.
DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.74.2.285
发表时间: 1998-02
影响因子: 7.6
作者:
J. Shah;E. T. Higgins;Friedman;Ronald S. Friedman
通讯作者: J. Shah;E. T. Higgins;Friedman;Ronald S. Friedman