Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems
Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems
复制标题
联盟形成问题中的联盟一致与策略验证
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-012-0318-x
复制
发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Koji TAKAMIYA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Koji Takamiya;Akira Tanaka;Koji TAKAMIYA
本文从机制设计的角度研究了联盟形成问题。我们考虑的情况下，（i）列表offeasable联盟（这些联盟被允许形成）是预先给定的;和（ii）每个人的偏好是一个排名超过这些可行的联盟，其中包括这个人。我们感兴趣的是，要求该机制保证每个联盟都有组成该联盟的“权利”，至少当联盟的每个成员都将该联盟排在最前面时。我们称之为联盟的共同性。我们考察了联盟一致性和激励要求之间的兼容性，并证明如果该机制是防策略的并尊重联盟一致性，那么对于每个偏好配置文件，最多存在一个严格的核心稳定分区，并且该机制在可用时选择这样的分区。此外，该机制是联盟的策略证明和尊重联盟的一致性，当且仅当，严格的核心稳定分区唯一存在的每个偏好配置文件。
This paper examinescoalition formation problemsfrom the viewpoint of mechanism design. We consider the case where (i) the list offeasible coalitions(those coalitions which are permitted to form) is given in advance; and (ii) each individual’s preference is a ranking over those feasible coalitions which include this individual. We are interested in requiring the mechanism to guarantee each coalition the “right” of forming that coalition at least when every member of the coalition ranks the coalition at the top. We name this propertycoalitional unanimity. We examine the compatibility between coalitional unanimity and incentive requirements, and prove that if the mechanism isstrategy-proofand respects coalitional unanimity, then for each preference profile, there exists at most onestrictly core stable partition, and the mechanism chooses such a partition whenever available. Further, the mechanism iscoalition strategy-proofand respects coalitional unanimity if, and only if, the strictly core stable partition uniquely exists for every preference profile.