MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL POWER IN CORPORATE NETWORKS
MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL POWER IN CORPORATE NETWORKS
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DOI：
10.37190/ord210106
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发表时间：
2021-01-01
影响因子：
0.4
通讯作者：
Mercik, Jacek
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Stach, Izabella;Mercik, Jacek
本文讨论了在复杂的公司持股网络中衡量间接控制的几种博弈论方法。这些方法使用权力指数来估计股权结构中的直接控制和间接控制。这些方法中的一些只估计了投资者(没有持股的公司)的控制权，只有少数方法衡量了所有参与持股网络的公司(即投资者和股份公司)的控制权。这些方法中没有一个考虑到相互联系(网络中的边缘)的重要性，因此我们在本文中特别关注这些方法的扩展，以衡量参与复杂股权结构的公司(由网络中的节点表示)的控制权以及公司之间作为整个公司股权网络要素的联系的重要性(权力)。更准确地说，我们将我们的方法应用于一个企业网络的理论例子。此外，我们继续考虑间接控制测量的合理性质。对新的性质提出了一些看法。本文还对有关这一主题的文献进行了简要回顾。
This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods for measuring indirect control in complex corporate shareholding networks. The methods use power indices to estimate the direct and indirect control in shareholding structures. Some of these methods only estimate the control power of investors (firms without shareholdings), and only a few measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks (which means investors and stock companies). None of them takes measuring the importance of mutual connections (edges in the networks) into consideration; thus we focus in particular on an extension of these methods in this paper to measure both the control-power of the firms involved in complex shareholding structures (represented by nodes in networks) and the importance (power) of linkages between the firms as elements of a whole corporate shareholding network. More precisely, we apply our approaches to a theoretical example of a corporate network. Moreover, we continue the considerations about reasonable properties for indirect control measurement. Some ideas of new properties are proposed. The paper also provides a brief review of the literature concerning the topic.