Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance
Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1010268
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发表时间：
2007-04
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Xuanming Su;Fuqiang Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xuanming Su;Fuqiang Zhang
本文研究了战略客户行为对供应链绩效的影响。我们从面对前瞻性客户的新闻企业卖家开始。卖方最初会收取正常价格，但可能会在实现随机需求后以较低的打捞价格来挽救剩余的库存。客户可以预期未来的销售，并选择购买时机以最大程度地提高预期盈余。我们表征了理性期望平衡，在那里我们发现卖方的存货水平低于没有战略客户的经典模型中的库存水平。我们表明，通过承诺可用的数量将是有限的（数量承诺），或者价格将保持较高（价格承诺），可以提高卖方的利润。在大多数情况下，两种形式的承诺在与单个卖方的集中供应链中都不可信。但是，分散的供应链可以将合同安排用作间接承诺设备，以实现承诺。权力下放通常与协调问题有关，但是我们提出了一种对比的观点，即供应链中的不同利益实际上可以改善整体供应链绩效。特别是，通过战略性的客户行为，我们发现（i）具有批发价格合同的分散供应链可能比集中式供应链更好地表现更好； （ii）在供应链协调文献中广泛研究的合同（例如，降级货币，销售回扣和回购合同）可以用作承诺设备以及激励协调的设备； （iii）上述某些合同由于战略性客户行为而无法在供应链成员之间任意分配利润。
This paper studies the impact of strategic customer behavior on supply chain performance. We start with a newsvendor seller facing forward-looking customers. The seller initially charges a regular price but may salvage the leftover inventory at a lower salvage price after random demand is realized. Customers anticipate future sales and choose purchase timing to maximize their expected surplus. We characterize the rational expectations equilibrium, where we find that the seller's stocking level is lower than that in the classic model without strategic customers. We show that the seller's profit can be improved by promising either that quantities available will be limited (quantity commitment) or that prices will be kept high (price commitment). In most cases, both forms of commitment are not credible in a centralized supply chain with a single seller. However, decentralized supply chains can use contractual arrangements as indirect commitment devices to attain the desired outcomes with commitment. Decentralization has generally been associated with coordination problems, but we present the contrasting view that disparate interests within a supply chain can actually improve overall supply chain performance. In particular, with strategic customer behavior, we find that (i) a decentralized supply chain with a wholesale price contract may perform strictly better than a centralized supply chain; (ii) contracts widely studied in the supply chain coordination literature (e.g., markdown money, sales rebates, and buyback contracts) can serve as a commitment device as well as an incentive-coordinating device; and (iii) some of the above contracts cannot allocate profits arbitrarily between supply chain members because of strategic customer behavior.