Bank Equity Stakes in Borrowing Firms and Financial Distresses
Bank Equity Stakes in Borrowing Firms and Financial Distresses
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银行在借款公司中的股权和财务困境
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/9.3.889
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Saunders
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mitchell Berlin;Kose John;A. Saunders
当借款公司的不知情的利益相关者依赖银行来确定公司是否陷入困境以及利益相关者是否有必要做出让步时，作者得出了银行的最优财务索赔。银行的财务索赔旨在确保它不会与健康公司的所有者串通寻求不必要的让步，也不会与陷入困境的公司的所有者串通声称公司是健康的。为了证明让步请求不是来自一个健康的公司/银行联盟，当公司陷入困境时，银行必须持有非常小或非常大的股权。为了证明陷入困境的公司和银行没有合谋声称该公司是健康的，银行可能需要在常规财务条件下持有股权。
The authors derive optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowing firm's uninformed stakeholders depend on the bank to establish whether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholders are necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensure that it cannot collude with a healthy firm's owners to seek unnecessary concessions or to collude with a distressed firm's owners to claim that the firm is healthy. To prove that a request for concessions has not come from a healthy firm/bank coalition, the bank must hold either a very small or a very large equity stake when the firm enters distress. To prove that a distressed firm and the bank have not colluded to claim that the firm is healthy, the bank may need to hold equity under routine financial conditions.