The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Wages and Employment
The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Wages and Employment
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外商直接投资对工资和就业的影响
DOI：
10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028646
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Laixun Zhao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Laixun Zhao
本文研究了外商直接投资（FDI）对工资和就业的影响。当劳资谈判是在整个行业范围内进行时，FDI的两种效应被确定为：共谋效应和威胁点效应。结果表明：（1）外国直接投资总是降低谈判工资;（2）如果工会更关心就业而不是工资，或者同样关心就业和工资，外国直接投资就会降低工会就业和竞争性工资。但是，如果劳资谈判是企业特有的，而工会化是整个行业的，那么外国直接投资的上述效果就会大大降低。版权所有1998年由皇家经济学会。
This paper studies the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on wages and employment. When labor-management bargaining is industrywide, two effects of FDI are identified: the collusion effect and the threat-point effect. It is shown that: (1) FDI always reduces the negotiated wage and (2) FDI reduces union employment and the competitive wage if the union cares more about employment than wages or is equally concerned about employment and wages. However, if labor-management bargaining is firm-specific and unionization is industrywide, then the above effects of FDI are substantially reduced. Copyright 1998 by Royal Economic Society.