Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities
Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities
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大量选民和有决定性的少数派
DOI：
10.1086/250094
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Colin M. Campbell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Colin M. Campbell
在许多情况下，即使在民主国家，少数选民的政治偏好也反映在政治结果中。结果表明，对于一个简单的两种选择的选举环境，其特征是昂贵的投票和私人信息，当预期人口非常大时，更预期的“热心”选民所偏好的选择，他们要么在选举结果中有很大的利害关系，要么参与成本很小，在任何均衡中都以很高的概率获胜，即使整个选民中预期的分享这种偏好的比例是任意小的。根据两种自然但非常不同的规范标准，这是一个不可取的结果。
There are many instances in which even in a democracy, the political preferences held by a minority of the electorate are reflected in political outcomes. It is shown that for a simple two‐alternative election environment characterized by costly voting and private information, when the expected population is very large the alternative preferred by more expected “zealous” voters, who have either large stakes in the outcome of the election or small costs of participating, wins with high probability in any equilibrium, even if the expected proportion of the entire electorate that shares that preference is arbitrarily small. This is an undersirable outcome under either of two natural but very different normative criteria.