Conditional on Conditionality: IMF Program Design and Foreign Direct Investment
Conditional on Conditionality: IMF Program Design and Foreign Direct Investment
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有条件的条件：国际货币基金组织的计划设计和外国直接投资
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Byungwon Woo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Byungwon Woo
本文探讨了国际货币基金组织（IMF）的计划设计如何影响外国直接投资流入。作者认为，IMF更严格的条件性标志着参与国政府对经济改革的承诺，因为它会带来更大的事前政治成本和事后政治成本。因此，国际货币基金组织计划的催化作用是有条件的：条件更严格的计划比条件不那么严格的计划催化更多的外国直接投资。对国际货币基金组织条件性数据集的实证分析支持这一论点，并表明，在考虑国际货币基金组织计划参与后，国际货币基金组织计划中包含的结构性条件越多，流入该国的外国直接投资就越多。
The article explores how International Monetary Fund (IMF) program design influences foreign direct investment inflows. The author argues that stricter IMF conditionality signals a program-participating government's commitment to economic reforms, as it incurs larger ex ante political cost and risks greater ex post political cost. Thus, the catalytic effect of an IMF program is conditional on conditionality: programs with stricter conditions catalyze more foreign direct investment than those with less stringent conditions. Empirical analysis of the IMF conditionality dataset supports the argument and shows that after accounting for IMF program participation, the more structural conditions included in an IMF program, the more foreign direct investment flows into the country.