The Interplay between Information Acquisition and Quality Disclosure
The Interplay between Information Acquisition and Quality Disclosure
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信息获取与质量披露之间的相互作用
DOI：
10.1111/poms.12651
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发表时间：
2017-03-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Chen, Ying-Ju
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Guan, Xu;Chen, Ying-Ju
本研究探讨了在供应链环境下，制造商私下知道自己的产品质量，但不确定消费者偏好的情况下，制造商的信息获取与质量披露策略之间的相互作用。我们认为制造商应该将其信息获取和质量披露决策视为一个整合的过程，因为这些决策会显著影响零售商对产品质量的理性推断，并可能对其自身的盈利能力产生冲突影响。虽然信息获取有助于制造商随后制定更好的定价和质量披露策略，但它也会向零售商泄露某些产品信息，从而帮助零售商更好地估计产品质量。因此，在均衡状态下，制造商可能选择不获取任何消费者信息，即使这种获取是无成本的。此外，我们发现这种获取的不利影响高度依赖于披露成本和消费者的偏好差异。消费者偏好差异的增加可能与制造商的利润存在非单调关系，一旦披露成本足够高，信息获取可能对制造商不利。
This study investigates the interactions between a manufacturer's information acquisition and quality disclosure strategies in a supply chain setting in which the manufacturer privately knows his product quality but is uncertain about consumer preferences. We argue that the manufacturer should treat his information acquisition and quality disclosure decisions as an integrated process because these decisions can significantly influence a retailer's rational inferences about product quality and can have conflicting effects on his own profitability. Although information acquisition helps a manufacturer subsequently craft better pricing and quality disclosure strategies, it also leaks certain product information to the retailer, thus helping the retailer better estimate product quality. Therefore, in equilibrium, a manufacturer may choose not to acquire any consumer information, even when such acquisition is costless. Moreover, we find that this adverse effect of acquisition is highly dependent on the cost of disclosure and consumers’ preference differentiation. Increased consumer preference differentiation may have a non‐monotonic relationship with the manufacturer's profit, and information acquisition can become detrimental to the manufacturer once the disclosure cost is sufficiently high.