Price volatility and service interruption risk-hedging by transmission contract
Price volatility and service interruption risk-hedging by transmission contract
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DOI：
10.1109/pes.2006.1708994
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发表时间：
2006-10
影响因子：
6.6
通讯作者：
P. Attaviriyanupap;A. Yokoyama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Attaviriyanupap;A. Yokoyama
在本文中，我们提出了一种在解除管制的电力系统中实现可靠性和风险对冲的输电合同。拟议的输电合同由输电系统运营商（TSO）执行，是发电公司（GENCO）、TSO、配电公司（DISCO）和大用户之间协议的产物。拟议的输电合同将为 GENCO 带来一定的收入，并激励新的投资以满足未来的需求。此外，它还可以帮助DISCO和大消费者对冲因现货市场价格波动而带来的风险。此外，对于负载需要高可靠电力的大用户来说，拟议的合同保证其负载始终得到供应，否则，他或她将获得服务中断的补偿。通过使用基于两种市场模型的模拟来显示有效性，特别是从消费者的角度来看：池模型和混合池/双边模型。
In this paper, we propose a transmission contract for reliability and risk-hedging in the deregulated power system. The proposed transmission contract, which is conducted by the transmission system operator (TSO), is a product of the agreements between the generation company (GENCO), the TSO, the distribution company (DISCO), and the large consumer. The proposed transmission contract results in a certain income of the GENCO and provides an incentive for new investments to meet demand in the future. Furthermore, it can help the DISCO and the large consumer hedge the risks, which are caused by the volatility of the price in the spot market. Additionally, for the large consumer, whose load needs high reliable electricity, the proposed contract gives a guarantee that his or her load will always be supplied, or otherwise, he or she will receive a compensation for the service interruption. The effectiveness, especially from the consumer's viewpoint, is shown by using the simulation based on two market models: pool model and mixed pool/bilateral model.