Stock Vesting Conditions, Control Benefits and Managerial Replacement
Stock Vesting Conditions, Control Benefits and Managerial Replacement
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DOI：
10.1111/caje.12323
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发表时间：
2018-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Meg Adachi‐Sato
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Meg Adachi‐Sato
本文研究了股权激励的授予条件对公司更换经理人决策的影响。我指出，公司可能会过度更换经理与长期和短期既得股票为基础的补偿，而过度保留只能由短期既得选择权。如果贴现因子足够小，我还表明，短期既得股票为基础的补偿是均衡合同。这项研究还对有关强制推迟和收回高管薪酬的规定产生了影响。
This article considers the effect of vesting conditions of stock-based compensation on firms decisions to replace managers. I indicate that firms may excessively replace managers with both long- and short-term vested stock-based compensation, while excessive retention can be caused only by short-term vested options. If the discount factor is sufficiently small, I also show that short-term vested stock-based compensation is the equilibrium contract. The study also has implications for regulations concerning mandatory deferral and clawback of executive pay.