Implementing Monetary Cooperation Through Inflation Targeting
Implementing Monetary Cooperation Through Inflation Targeting
复制标题
通过通胀目标制实施货币合作
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Pierpaolo Benigno
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gianluca Benigno;Pierpaolo Benigno
本文提出了一个不完全竞争和名义价格刚性的两国动态一般均衡模型，其中贸易条件冲击与非效率供给冲击并存。分析了最优合作解的性质。虽然贸易条件的冲击应该被汇率的变动所抵消，但低效率的供应冲击更有可能成为固定汇率制度的理由。令人惊讶的是，我们表明，最佳的合作解决方案可以通过通货膨胀目标制在战略背景下实施。在这些制度下，每个货币当局只考虑国内目标，即GDP通胀和产出缺口。即使合作能带来收益，内向型货币政策制定者也能实现第一个最佳目标。
This Paper presents a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with imperfect competition and nominal price rigidities in which terms of trade shocks coexist with inefficient supply shocks. We analyse the features of the optimal cooperative solution. While terms of trade shocks should be offset by movements in the exchange rate, inefficient supply shocks are more likely to make a case for a fixed exchange rate regime. Surprisingly, we show that the optimal cooperative solution can be implemented in a strategic context through inflation-targeting regimes. Under these regimes each monetary authority weighs only domestic targets, namely GDP inflation and output gap. Even if there are gains from cooperation, inward-looking monetary policymakers can achieve the first best.