Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making
Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making
复制标题
多数决策中的自利、不平等和权利
DOI：
10.1561/100.00000015
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Sean Gailmard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Diermeier;Sean Gailmard
我们用固定的、已知的不一致值对三人多数派讨价还价模型的竞争性理论进行了实验测试。受试者被随机分配到三个角色：一个提倡者和两种类型的选民。每个角色都被随机分配了一个不一致的值，即如果提案被拒绝，他/她将获得给定的金额。在做出任何决定之前，所有玩家都知道这些值。然后，提名人就如何在玩家之间分配一笔固定的、已知的金额提出了一个要么接受要么放弃的提议。如果大多数玩家接受该提议，则该玩家的收益由该提议决定；如果该提议被拒绝，则每个玩家都会收到他或她的预留价值。我们评估了三种行为假设--自利、平等主义和不平等厌恶--解释我们结果的能力。我们的主要设计变量是提出者的保留值，这允许我们从每个假设中获得不同的含义。我们发现，每个假设在重要方面都与我们的数据不一致。然而，受试者对预订值的变化反应强烈，就好像它们被解释为一种基本的权利形式一样。
We experimentally test competing theories of three-player majoritarian bargaining models with fixed, known disagreement values. Subjects are randomly assigned to three roles: a proposer and two types of voters. Each role is randomly assigned a disagreement value, i.e. a given amount of money he/she will receive if the proposal is rejected. These values are known to all players before any decision is made. Proposers then make a take-it-or-leave-it offer on how to split a fixed, known amount of money among the players. If a majority of players accepts the proposal, the players' payoffs are determined by the proposal; if the proposal is rejected, each player receives his or her reservation value. We assess the ability of three behavioral hypotheses – self-interest, egalitarianism, and inequality-aversion – to account for our results. Our primary design variable is the proposer's reservation value, which allows us to obtain different implications from each hypothesis. We find that each hypothesis is inconsistent with our data in important respects. However, subjects strongly respond to changes in reservation values as if they were interpreted as a basic form of entitlement.