The Walk-down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*
The Walk-down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*
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DOI：
10.1506/khnw-pjyl-adub-0rp6
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发表时间：
2004-12
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Scott Richardson;S. Teoh;Peter D. Wysocki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Scott Richardson;S. Teoh;Peter D. Wysocki
证券监管机构和商业媒体称，这些公司玩的是一种“收益指引游戏”，分析师在年初做出乐观的预测，然后将他们的预期“下调”到公司年底可以超过的水平。在I/B/E/S个人分析师对1983-1998年年度收益预测的综合样本中，我们发现1992年后时期的主张得到了有力的支持。我们研究是否“走下”击败目标与经理人的激励出售股票后，盈利公告代表公司（通过新股发行）或从他们的个人账户（内幕交易）。与这些假设相一致，我们发现，“向下走”到击败目标是最明显的公司，无论是净发行人的股票或公司的经理净卖家的股票后，盈利公告。这些发现为资本市场激励如何影响管理者和分析师之间的沟通提供了新的见解。
Security regulators and the business press have alleged that firms play an 'earnings-guidance game' where analysts make optimistic forecasts at the start of the year and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level the firm can beat by the end of the year. In a comprehensive sample of I/B/E/S individual analysts' forecasts of annual earnings from 1983-1998, we find strong support for the claim in the post-1992 period. We examine whether the 'walk down' to beatable targets is associated with managers' incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (via new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (insider trades). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the 'walk down' to beatable targets is most pronounced in firms that are either net issuers of equity or in firms where managers are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on how capital market incentives affect communications between managers and analysts.