Tax competition and political agency problems
Tax competition and political agency problems
复制标题
税收竞争和政治代理问题
DOI：
10.1111/caje.12569
复制
发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Satoshi Kasamatsu and Daiki Kishishita
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tran Trang;Goto Hiromasa;Matsuda Takuma;Satoshi Kasamatsu and Daiki Kishishita
我们研究了在政府间竞争存在的情况下，政治家的声誉问题如何影响税收。为此，我们构建了一个两国非对称税收竞争模型，其中一个国家的居民面临国内政治代理问题：居民不知道现任政治家是仁慈的还是利维坦。为了与利维坦政治家划清界限，吸引选民支持，仁慈的政治家主张税收过低，这可以被视为反税收的民粹主义。这种反税收的民粹主义表现出以下两个特性。首先，民粹主义国家相对于其他国家的低生产技术促进了反税收民粹主义的出现。其次，反税收民粹主义可以改善民粹主义国家或整个世界的福利，这取决于生产技术的不对称性。
We study how politicians' reputation concerns affect taxation in the presence of intergovernmental competition. To this end, we construct a two‐country asymmetric tax competition model in which the residents in one of the two countries face a domestic political agency problem: the residents do not know whether the incumbent politician is benevolent or leviathan. To separate themselves from leviathan politicians and attract voters’ support, benevolent politicians argue for excessively low taxation, which can be regarded as anti‐taxation populism. This anti‐taxation populism exhibits the following two properties. First, the populist country's low production technology relative to the other country facilitates the emergence of anti‐taxation populism. Second, anti‐taxation populism can improve welfare in terms of either the populist country or the whole world, depending on the asymmetry of the production technology.